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Abstract
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on European economic and social mo-
dels. It provides a comparative assessment of fiscal and regulatory policies in 17 indu-
strialised countries (the EU15, US and Japan) and presents the records of these countri-
es in attaining key economic and social objectives. 
Social and economic systems that feature efficient public sectors and flexible mar-
ket structures tend to experience reasonably sustainable public finances, high economic 
growth, education standards and employment, and well-functioning markets. Anglo-Saxon 
countries broadly fit this mould, albeit, seemingly, at some cost of income equality. A more 
pronounced emphasis on welfare state policies and the corresponding relatively high le-
vels of public spending bring benefit to income distribution in the Nordic countries while 
the resulting inefficiencies in their economies are counterbalanced by flexibility in labo-
ur and particularly product markets. Also, a number of reform-minded European coun-
tries have improved their fiscal and regulatory policies while significantly enhancing the 
functioning of markets, fiscal sustainability and economic performance. This was gene-
rally attained without jeopardising social objectives. On the other hand, those continen-
tal and Mediterranean countries that maintain market inefficiencies and at the same time 
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sustain expensive and inefficient welfare states generally suffer from low growth and em-
ployment and less well-functioning markets and face serious risks to their economies’ fis-
cal sustainability. The findings of this note support calls for the comprehensive reform of 
fiscal policies, as well as of product and labour markets. 
Keywords: fiscal policy, regulation, Nordic model, welfare state, efficiency, reform
1 Introduction
Recently, a prominent debate on how EU Member States should deal with econo-
mic and social challenges has emerged in Europe under the catch-phrase “Economic and 
Social Models”. Should Europe follow the “Nordic model”, often (rightly or wrongly) 
characterised as big government, high taxes and cradle-to-grave security, or rather the 
“Anglo-Saxon model” with presumably low spending, low taxes, flexible markets, but 
social inequality? Are there viable alternatives that combine good economic performan-
ce with adequate social protection and well-functioning markets?1 
The debate derives from three major policy challenges that are pertinent particular-
ly to Europe and the functioning of EMU. First, for the period covered by our data (i.e. 
up to 2005) and by historical standards, a number of countries are experiencing relatively 
low economic growth coupled with relatively high unemployment and welfare systems 
that have partially come under considerable strain. Second, globalisation means that esta-
blished “first-world” economies (with relatively large public sectors) face new and incre-
asing challenges (regarding e.g. the viability of labour-intensive industries and some ser-
vices) in the face of competition from emerging players such as China and India (with si-
gnificantly smaller public sectors), which in turn may exert pressure on domestic econo-
mic and social systems. Third, the combination of low fertility rates and rising life expec-
tancy in the euro area implies that the working-age population will decrease whereas the 
proportion of elderly people in the population will increase (ECB, 2006). This will have 
important consequences for labour supply, real GDP growth, public finances and inco-
me distribution. In response to these challenges, in 2000, the EU agreed on the so-called 
“Lisbon Strategy”, which was re-launched in 2005 with the focus on “growth and jobs” 
in order to improve the implementation of reforms (ECB, 2005).
In this paper, we analyse the effects of economic and social policies with regard to 
public sector and market regulations of 17 industrialised countries (the EU15, US and, to 
a lesser extent due to data limitations, Japan). In relation to the ongoing debate on econo-
mic and social models, we provide stylised facts on country performance as regards the 
attainment of those key policy objectives that are relevant for the economic and social 
models debate. These include the sustainability of public finances, solid growth and high 
1 See, for example, The Economist (2006): “Admire the best, forget the rest”, 9 September; Financial Times 
(2006): “The devaluation saga of Sweden’s industrial rebirth”, 11 September. European policy fora have also dis-
cussed EU common social values, the structural challenges posed by globalisation and demographic change, as well 
as the associated need for a structural reform and an appropriate economic and social policy response in the EU Mem-
ber States (e.g. the 7-8 April 2006 informal ECOFIN Council meeting in Vienna http://www.eu2006.at/de/News/
information/0804InformalECOFIN.html).257
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employment in a well-educated population, a “fair” income distribution and well-functio-
ning labour and product markets. We also assess the findings on performance from a per-
spective of efficiency by looking at the relevant fiscal and regulatory policy inputs. These 
include public expenditure policies, tax policies and market regulation.2 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section outlines the 
conceptual approach and discusses methodological caveats and measurement issues. The 
third section describes public expenditure patterns across the sample countries and assesses 
the efficiency of fiscal policy with regard to the sustainability of public finances, growth, 
employment and education standards, as well as income distribution. The fourth section 
turns to the characteristics of market regulation and the assessment of the functioning of 
labour and product markets with regard to employment, output and market adjustment. 
Section 5 summarises the findings and conclusions.
2 The conceptual approach
Before starting to evaluate economic and social policy regimes in industrialised co-
untries, it is worth briefly discussing conceptual issues and related measurement chall-
enges. 
The assessment of countries’ economic and social models ideally requires three ele-
ments: (i) a set of objectives that governments should attain, (ii) reasonably high-quali-
ty and internationally comparable indicators on the “performance” of countries in atta-
ining these objectives (iii) indicators that measure the policy inputs used to attain such 
performance. 
As regards (i), it is not trivial to define the relevant objectives of government polici-
es. The economic and political philosophy debate provides some guidance. Classical eco-
nomists from Adam Smith have strongly emphasized the role of government in providing 
functioning markets aimed at enhancing the opportunities of individuals for specialisati-
on and mutually beneficial exchange. More recently, part of the public finance literature, 
notably Musgrave, has defined economic efficiency, stability and income distribution as 
the main government and, in particular, fiscal policy objectives. Another way of looking 
at these two approaches is to argue that individual preferences or “utility” are affected by 
growth and economic prosperity that is stable and broadly-based, and the liberty to pursue 
emerging opportunities in the market place. Of course, these two approaches are closely 
intertwined and functioning markets, efficiency-enhancing public spending and well-de-
signed social policies can in principle support growth, equality and opportunities. 
As regards (ii), we try to measure the degree to which government policies help the 
attainment of these objectives via a number of comparable indicators that measure fiscal 
sustainability (which is a prerequisite for macroeconomic stability), real economic growth 
and education standards (prosperity), the Gini coefficient (that measures income distribu-
2 This approach follows recent studies on public expenditure reform experiences conducted by Schuknecht and 
Tanzi (2005), as well as Hauptmeier, Heipertz and Schuknecht (2006). A more technical analysis of fiscal policy effi-
ciency can be found in Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005; 2006).258
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tion) and indicators of the functioning of labour, capital and product markets (that mea-
sure opportunities in the markets). 
As regards the measurement of policy inputs (iii), we look at indicators of policy in-
puts in the fiscal sphere (total public spending, spending on transfers and education) and 
in the regulatory sphere (labour, product and capital market regulation) with respect to the 
attainment of policy objectives. This will help to gauge the overall policy efficiency. 
For the sake of scope and comprehensiveness of our presentation and analysis, we 
employ a simple approach and look at stylised facts via correlations between policy per-
formance and input variables and their changes over time. The stylised facts approach 
has obvious shortcomings, as it cannot establish firm propositions about the direction of 
causality, nor can it describe the greater complexity of multivariate relationships. Moreo-
ver, some important output and input features cannot be easily quantified, or are not fully 
comparable across countries. There is also considerable confusion as to the meaning of 
different concepts, and the choice of indicators at times strongly influences the results 
(for example, see Annex 1). The advantage of this approach, however, is that it allows 
the compilation, structuring and identification of instructive patterns from a rich, com-
plex and dispersed set of policy variables. Moreover, we also try to underpin our results 
by putting the findings into perspective within the broader and technically more sophisti-
cated discussion in the literature.3
3 The role of fiscal policy
3.1 The size of government
Section 2 suggests that, before assessing countries’ performance, it is worth taking 
stock of the magnitude of the overall public resource use. Countries differ strongly in the 
relative size of their public and private sectors. Figure 1 shows developments in the total 
expenditure ratio for general government (which includes all levels of government, as 
well as social insurances) over the last decade for the 17 sample countries and puts it into 
relation to social spending, i.e. the biggest expenditure item of national budgets. Despite 
a significant divergence between individual countries, it shows that the role of the public 
sector is very important in all of these economies today and it strongly correlates with so-
cial spending. 
Figure 1 also shows that the Nordic countries as well as several continental and Medi-
terranean countries are associated with “moderately big” to “very big” governments, with 
public spending at levels near or above 50% of GDP. Government spending in Anglo-
Saxon countries, particularly the US and Ireland, but also Spain and Luxembourg, ran-
3 For more detailed and technical elaborations on the efficiency of expenditure policies see, for example, Afon-
so, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) in the debate on the “quality of public finances”. This approach is the basis for the 
ongoing work on the quality of public finances, carried out by a corresponding EPC Working Group mandated by the 
ECOFIN Council, as well as OECD and IMF. The discussion in these fora looks at government performance through 
a range of variables that proxy the attainment of key policy objectives (growth, income distribution, stability, func-
tioning markets and equal opportunity) relative to the fiscal expenditure inputs, using a comparative perspective to 
derive efficiency scores. 259
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ges between 30% and 40% of GDP. Japan could also be seen among this group, although 
the delineation of its public sector is less straightforward compared to the other countri-
es. In any case, no public sector today is small when compared to the expenditure levels 
after World War II and up to the 1960s (when spending in industrialised countries barely 
averaged 30% of GDP), and Western budgets, including that of Japan, look even larger 
when compared to today’s emerging market economies in Asia, where public spending 
is well below 30% of GDP. 
A substantial proportion of a country’s public sector nowadays is devoted to its wel-
fare state policy, reflected in a high correlation between social and total spending. Figure 
1 on the right-hand graph also reports gross social spending ratios in the sample countri-
es. These largely determine the differences in total spending across countries, since dif-
ferences in spending on public consumption and investment across industrialised coun-
try governments are much more limited. As regards social spending, the Nordic countri-
es and several continental and Mediterranean countries again stand out as the “biggest” 
spenders. However, the numbers presented here are not fully comparable. There are con-
siderable discrepancies between gross and net social expenditure levels, as some gover-
nments – especially those of the Nordics – levy direct taxes and social security contribu-
tions on cash transfers, while others pay out untaxed benefits or even provide tax credits 
(see Adema (2001) as well as Adema and Ladaique (2006)). 
3.2 Fiscal sustainability
Here we first consider the sustainability of fiscal policies across countries or, in other 
words, whether the size of government and the corresponding social model might interfe-
re fundamentally with fiscal discipline. This is important because fiscal discipline clearly 
constitutes a prerequisite for maintaining macroeconomic and price stability and thus for 
the confidence in the euro. Looking at developments over recent decades reveals some 
interesting patterns (see Figure 2). 
For the average of euro area countries, the strong growth of public spending since the 
1970s was accompanied by a rapidly deteriorating fiscal balance. These deficits then per-
sisted in many countries in the 1980s and coincided with a continued debt build-up until 
the mid-1990s. Developments over the last decade, however, show that significant ex-
penditure reform can improve the fiscal position of a country as well as of the euro area 
average. A large number of countries reduced public spending over this period as part of 
a comprehensive reform effort that also included important structural measures, reversing 
the upward trend in expenditure developments and regaining positive primary balances and 
more sustainable fiscal positions.4 For the euro area as a whole, this implied that the ge-
neral government budget balance improved until 2000, before deteriorating again in more 
recent years when expenditure reform came to a halt. Figure 2 also illustrates the strong 
correlation between expenditure reform and improving fiscal balances between the mid 
1990s and 2005. In the wake of deficit reductions, public debt started to fall. As a result 
4 See Hauptmeier, Heipertz and Schuknecht (2006), as well as Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) for a detailed dis-
cussion.261
M. Heipertz and M. Ward-Warmedinger: Economic and Social Models in Europe
and the Importance of Reform
Financial Theory and Practice 32 (3) 255-287 (2008)
debt                        balance                primary balance
%
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
%
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
 
(
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
)
  8
  6
  4
  2
  0
-2
-4
-6
-8
General government debt and deficit ratios in the euro area (% of GDP)
Source: AMECO Database
1970 1975 1980  1985  1990 1995 2000  2005
expenditures               revenues              balance
%
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
55
50
45
40
35
30
%
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
 
(
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
)
 8
 6
 4
 2
 0
-2
-4
-6
-8
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Figure 2 Changes in expenditure, deficits and debt for the euro area average
General government expenditure and revenue ratios in the euro area (% of GDP)
Source: AMECO Database262
M. Heipertz and M. Ward-Warmedinger: Economic and Social Models in Europe
and the Importance of Reform
Financial Theory and Practice 32 (3) 255-287 (2008)
of these developments, the following pattern in the sustainability of individual countries 
with respect to their deficit and debt situation emerges today (see Table 1): 
The first two columns show that the Nordic countries, while being the biggest (total 
and social) spenders, still have sound budget balances and relatively low debt ratios. The 
Anglo-Saxon countries report rather diverse budget positions but mostly moderate debt ra-
tios, with the notable exception of the US. The picture for continental and Mediterranean 
Table 1 2005 Fiscal position and the related sustainability of public finances
2005 gen. gov. 
balance
(% of GDP)
2005 gross national 
debt (% GDP)
Ageing-related 
fiscal burden 2005
S2 indicator 
(baseline scenario)
Anglo-Saxons
Ireland 1.0 27.6 7.8 2.9
UK -3.5 42.8 4.0 4.9
United States -3.8 65.0 n.a. n.a
group average -2.1 45.1 5.9 3.9
Continental and Mediterranean States
France -2.9 66.8 3.2 4.0
Germany -3.3 67.7 2.7 4.4
Greece -4.5 107.5 n.a. n.a
Italy -4.1 106.4 1.7 3.1
Portugal -6.0 63.9 10.1 10.5
Luxembourg -1.9 6.2 8.2 9.5
group average -3.8 69.7 5.2 6.3
Continental and Mediterranean Reformers
Austria -1.5 62.9 0.2 0.3
Belgium 0.1 93.3 6.3 1.8
Netherlands -0.3 52.9 5.0 1.3
Spain 1.1 43.2 8.5 3.2
group average -0.2 63.1 5.0 1.7
Nordics
Denmark 4.9 35.8 4.8 -2.2
Finland 2.6 41.1 5.2 -0.9
Sweden 2.9 50.3 2.2 -1.1
group average 3.5 42.4 4.1 -1.4
Other
Japan -6.5 158.9 n.a. n.a
Note: The ageing-related fiscal burden is calculated as the no-policy change increase in health and 
pension spending minus reduced public spending on education as published by the Economic Policy 
Committee (EPC) and the European Commission (2006). 
Source: AMECO Database, Commission Services, EPC.263
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countries is most diverse. The Mediterranean countries except Spain report the largest im-
balances. Several reform-minded countries (Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain) 
typically show sound or improving fiscal positions. A case apart is Japan, showing overall 
a seriously weakened fiscal position, to the extent that indicators are available.
For the EU15 countries, when adding the ageing-related fiscal burden to the picture 
(third column), we find that there is less of a pattern along these country groups but rat-
her according to the degree of reforms undertaken in the past. Note that public spending 
is expected to increase by as much as 10% of GDP until 2050 on account of higher pen-
sion, health and long-term care costs if there are no further social security reforms. Por-
tugal, Ireland, Spain and (despite the unavailability of estimates) Greece will be particu-
larly affected if they fail to undertake the necessary reforms. 
For an overall assessment of fiscal sustainability, as recently conducted by the EU 
Commission and the EPC in the Sustainability Report (2006), it is instructive to consi-
der the so-called S2 sustainability indicator (fourth column of Table 1). Starting from a 
country’s current fiscal position, it measures the size of a hypothetical permanent budge-
tary adjustment that would be required to meet the inter-temporal budget constraint over 
an infinite horizon (often referred to as the “tax gap”). The indicator confirms the previous 
picture of the large diversity across countries, which can broadly be grouped as follows: 
The Nordics show a negative gap in the sense that their long-run sustainability appears 
to be reasonably assured. This should be viewed in conjunction with very ambitious ex-
penditure reforms that these countries have undertaken. However, given that the relative-
ly high spending levels of these countries will have to be sustained by correspondingly 
high revenue ratios, competitive pressures in a globalising world economy might cause 
the sustainability issue to resurface for any high-spending country. Other reforming co-
untries, and in particular Ireland, also show relatively low sustainability gaps and, given 
lower expenditure ratios, appear to be less vulnerable to this kind of pressure. Lastly, the 
non-reforming continental European and Mediterranean countries can already be seen as 
facing a serious risk in terms of long term fiscal sustainability, as reflected in their com-
paratively high S2 indicators. 
Hence, from several perspectives we find very diverse fiscal positions across indu-
strialised countries. Over recent decades, strong spending growth was first correlated with 
deteriorating deficit and debt positions. Expenditure and social security reforms in recent 
years have significantly reduced sustainability risks in (a number of) continental Europe-
an and Nordic countries. Sustainability risks appear not to be correlated with large public 
sectors and social spending per se, but with large imbalances and unreformed welfare sy-
stems of a number of countries in continental and Mediterranean Europe. The public fi-
nances of continental and Mediterranean countries that have undertaken reforms appear 
to be much better positioned.
3.3 Economic growth
A key issue in the debate over the “right” economic and social model and the appro-
priate role of government is the growth performance of individual countries. Economic 
growth and its underlying “ingredients” – employment and capital and their productivi-
ty – are viewed as the key to economic prosperity and welfare. Proponents of “small” 264
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governments point to higher economic efficiency if more resources are left to the priva-
te sector. 
Also in the light of global competition for scarce human and physical capital, exce-
ssively high taxes are viewed as having a deterrent effect and could further undermine 
growth prospects in the future. As argued by Tanzi (2001), globalisation (through e-com-
merce, electronic money, intra-company trade, off-shoring, financial innovation etc.) can 
have a significant negative impact on countries’ ability to raise revenues through their tax 
systems. The findings in the literature on this theme are rather diverse but, on the whole, 
larger public sectors tend to feature lower growth, especially insofar as government expen-
diture is devoted to consumption items such as wages or social welfare and as the corres-
ponding high tax and social security burden hampers potential growth (for the relevant 
theory and evidence see Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2005).
Looking at the public expenditure and growth data from a historical perspective con-
firms this picture. Average economic growth declined during the 1960s in almost all in-
dustrialised countries, partially due to secular growth trends and a slow-down in catching 
up growth, but also due to the expansion in public spending. Figure 3 illustrates that, for 
example, an increase in the public spending ratio by 10 percentage points between 1960 
and 2000 was accompanied by an over 1 percentage point decline in the annual growth 
rate. Higher social spending and direct taxes coincided in particular with declining em-
ployment ratios and investment over this period (see also the labour market section below 
and Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2003). As a result, the converging trend of per capita incomes 
across industrialised countries which could be observed between the 1950s and 1970s 
seems to have slowed down or even halted in the past two decades. 
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The story would, however, conclude prematurely if we simply stated that large gover-
nment equals low efficiency and poor growth performance. We also need to take a look 
at the more recent experience, following the major expenditure reforms undertaken by a 
number of countries in the last decades (especially the United Kingdom, Ireland, Finland, 
Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and, to a lesser extent, Austria). All these coun-
tries have at some point achieved reductions in their primary spending ratios of at least 5 
percentage points over a period of seven years. The expenditure reductions of these “am-
bitious reformers” were flanked by important structural reforms of the benefit systems 
Figure 4 Expenditure reform and economic growth
Note: Potential growth is calculated using a production-function approach, as explained in European 
Commission (2007:296).
Source: AMECO.266
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as well as the factor and product markets (signalling the importance of cross-effects of 
reforms; for a more detailed analysis see Hauptmeier et al. 2006). During these reforms, 
trend growth accelerated significantly. At the same time, “timid reformers”, i.e. larger 
continental European as well as Mediterranean countries (except Spain) did not underta-
ke comparable measures and experienced anaemic and even declining trend growth. This 
is reflected in the left-hand graph of Figure 5, where T0 stands for the year of maximum 
public expenditure as a ratio of GDP when reforms started. Within a few years, ambitio-
us reformers experienced a strong revival of the upward trend, while the timid or non-re-
formers did not go through such an experience. 
The long-run relationship between the public sector behaviour and growth dynamics 
is also shown on the right-hand side of Figure 4, where contained growth in social spen-
ding is seen to coincide with comparatively more positive developments in the potential 
growth rate over time. Ireland again is a particular case at hand, showing a substantial re-
duction in the average social spending-to-GDP ratio in the 1990s compared to the 1980s, 
in conjunction with a remarkable pick-up in potential GDP growth, which, to some extent, 
can also be assigned to the effects of this country’s rapid catching-up process. Improve-
ments in the potential growth rates of a number of continental, Mediterranean and also 
Nordic countries are more limited, as most countries also show, on average, substantial 
increases in social spending in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.
A number of caveats, however, are warranted. The reported findings emerge from 
case studies on expenditure and structural reforms and – short of proving a causal relati-
on – illustrate the coincidence of reforms with higher growth. Moreover, there is no cer-
tainty that these trends can continue into the future in the sense that faster growth would 
truly reflect a higher trend path or only the transition dynamics to a higher output level. 
On the whole, it nevertheless appears that large public sectors coincide with lower growth 
(and hence, in this domain, countries show poor performance and low efficiency). Howe-
ver, reforms in spending and tax systems coupled with flexible market structures can, at 
least temporarily, countervail this tendency with reasonable success, as exemplified cu-
rrently by the Nordic countries. We will come back to the issue of what it takes to be able 
to “afford” large public sectors in later sections.
3.4 Education standards
Human capital formation is widely acknowledged as an important source of econo-
mic growth and also a policy tool in mastering some of the challenges posed by globa-
lisation. As the public sector is the principal financier and provider of education in most 
countries, both the level and efficiency of public spending should be particularly impor-
tant in consolidating an economy’s human capital base, the main comparative advantage 
of today’s industrialised countries. 
It is, however, telling that empirical evidence points to limits on the link between the 
amount of spending on education and outcomes (see e.g. Afonso et al. (2005) and Afonso 
and St. Aubyn (2005)). Aghion et al. (2007) suggest that the link between a university’s 
level of private funding and its research performance is positive when a university has au-
tonomy in spending its budget. Other studies (for instance, Hanushek and Luque, 2003) 267
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reveal little or no evidence of a positive link between increased spending on education 
and student test performance. The work by the OECD has also pointed to the existence of 
relevant inefficiencies in public spending on (secondary) education. 
Table 2 shows that all euro area countries increased education expenditure over the 
last decade. However, the proportion of annual GDP spent on tertiary education was si-
gnificantly smaller than in the US, predominantly due to far fewer funds from the priva-
te sector. Furthermore, the level of expenditure per student in the euro area countries was 
generally lower, particularly at the tertiary level. Arguably much could be achieved in a 
number of countries if existing funds were used more efficiently and if incentives for pri-
vate funding were enhanced.
Table 2 Expenditure on education (in USD)
Change in expenditure on 
educational institutions 
for all services per student 
(1995 to 2004)c
Expenditure on 
educational institutions 
for tertiary education 
as a % of GDP in 2004
Annual expenditure per student in euros 2004d
Primary, 
secondary and 
post-secondary
Tertiary Public Private Primary 
education
All 
secondary 
education
All tertiary 
education 
including 
R&D 
activities
Primary 
to tertiary 
education
Belgium n.a. n.a. 1.2 0.1 5,267 6,152 9,398 6,364
Germany 105 107 1.0 0.1 3,927 6,015 9,726 6,192
Ireland 181 126 1.0 0.1 4,303 5,643 8,104 5,328
Greeceb 192 151 1.1 n.a. 3,647 4,137 4,439 4,075
Spain 136 167 0.9 0.3 3,940 5,318 7,443 5,237
France n.a. n.a. 1.2 0.2 4,033 6,934 8,467 6,254
Italya,b 105 130 0.7 0.3 5,865 6,225 6,129 6,129
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10,681 14,187 n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 136 101 1.0 0.3 4,938 5,985 10,989 6,348
Austria n.a. 122 0.8 0.8 6,087 6,476 11,140 7,780
Portugala,b 154 98 0.9 0.1 3,715 4,895 6,144 4,610
Finland 122 110 1.7 0.1 4,429 5,906 9,925 6,189
Euro area 141 124 1.0 0.2 5,069 6,489 8,355 5,864
Denmark 121 123 1.8 0.1 6,413 7,023 12,083 7,751
Sweden 117 99 1.6 0.2 5,928 6,380 12,871 7,210
UK 120 93 0.8 0.3 4,715 5,627 9,114 5,770
USA 130 132 1.0 1.9 6,988 7,887 17,838 9,597
Note: euro area average is unweighted. aData on annual expenditure per student refer to public 
expenditure only. bData on change in expenditure per student refer to public expenditure/institutions only. 
cIndex of change between 1995 and 2004 (Expenditure is expressed at 2004 constant prices, deflated by 
GDP deflator; values represent an index with 1995=100). dConverted using PPPs for GDP, based on 
full-time equivalents, converted from US dollars to euro at January 2004 rates.
Source: OECD (2007) and ECB (2008). 268
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3.5 Income distribution
In a debate on economic and social models, the defenders of the “big” government 
and large social spending typically refer to far-reaching income re-distribution and a low 
poverty rate as a key policy objective (see also Sapír, 2005). It is argued that re-distri-
bution leads to more “justice” (assuming a strong connection between outcome equali-
ty and social justice). Furthermore, for political economy reasons, re-distribution is said 
to facilitate electoral acceptance of the necessary change and transformation in a globa-
lising economy. On the other hand, opponents of high levels of social spending not only 
point to a need for high tax burdens and the associated opportunity costs in terms of lower 
growth, but also flag the loss of individual opportunity and collective economic adapta-
bility, when people are caught in poverty traps, when employment opportunities disappe-
ar or when the fundamental microeconomic incentives of people and employers to save, 
invest, work and adapt are distorted.
Figure 5 Gini coefficient and social spending269
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It is undeniable that countries with large public sectors and social spending show a 
more equal income distribution (and, hence, a better “performance” in achieving outco-
me equality). This is confirmed by all available indicators, be it poverty rates, the income 
share of the poorest quintile of households or the so-called Gini coefficient, which in this 
paper is understood to denote the skewness of household disposable income distribution. 
Gini coefficients (which range between 0 and 1, 1 equalling perfect inequality) show hi-
gher numbers and hence higher inequality in countries with small public sectors (see the 
left-hand graph of Figure 5).
It is not surprising that the Nordic countries achieve the lowest Gini coefficients and 
thereby the comparatively highest degree of income equality in their populations, given 
that much of their public sector activity consists of re-distribution and the provision of 
social benefits. This is in contrast with the Anglo-Saxon countries, which accept higher 
levels of inequality in return for a less prominent (and less expensive) role of the public 
sector. However, inequality is high even in a number of countries that extensively enga-
ge in public social spending, such as the Mediterranean sample countries. This underlines 
the fact that the design and efficiency, rather than the sheer size of the welfare systems, 
may be most important for their success.
While on the surface, the figures suggest that higher social spending can result in a 
more equal income distribution, there are three points worth discussing (beyond questi-
oning the value of outcome equality as a standard for social justice): (i) how many reso-
urces are used (i.e. how efficient is social spending?), (ii) what are the opportunity costs 
in terms of growth and employment, and (iii) would a reduction in public expenditu-
re incur a high “cost” in terms of increasing inequality? As regards the first point, Figu-
re 6 implies that, in principle, one percentage point improvement in the Gini coefficient 
would “require” a two percentage points increase in the social spending ratio. Or, more 
concretely, Ireland’s income distribution is only a little less equal than the Germany’s or 
France’s (but more equal than the Italy’s), although its social spending ratio is only half 
as high. This finding is consistent with the literature in the sense that equal income dis-
tribution is increasingly dependent on rising fiscal (and economic) costs. The main rea-
son is the very poor targeting of a large part of social spending and hence its inefficiency, 
especially in countries with already large public sectors (for more details, see Immervoll 
et al., (2005), Pearson and Martin, (2005), as well as Tanzi and Schuknecht, (2000)). As 
we argued above, the required levels of social security contributions are likely to lead to 
a significant loss of growth and employment.
Finally, and from a forward-looking perspective, the correlation between changes in 
the level of social expenditure and changes in the Gini coefficient is not significant, which 
should be particularly relevant for reform-anxious policy makers. The right-hand graph 
of Figure 6 suggests that, if anything, countries that raised social spending experienced a 
larger deterioration of the Gini coefficients than countries that lowered social spending.5 
In Italy, for example, increases in social spending did not prevent inequality from rising, 
whereas a sharp reduction in social spending in Ireland was still associated with a rise in 
5 Taking out Ireland yields y = 0.046x + 2.087 and R² = 0.006, i.e. an even less significant relationship between 
increases in social spending and improvements in equality – re-enforcing the argument that higher social spending 
does not necessarily lead to a reduction of inequality.270
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equality. This finding reinforces the notion that, besides the level of public expenditure in 
the social policy domain, other factors must have a bearing on the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of public policies for income distribution.6 
In sum, while the amount of public money spent on social policy appears to be corre-
lated with equality in income distribution, the efficiency with which that money is used 
could be improved. In recent years, expenditure reforms seem to have been successfully 
conducted at a virtually zero or very little loss of equality relative to the experience of co-
untries that did not reform. Large potential gains in efficiency hence appear to be hidden in 
this domain. Furthermore, the large differences in tertiary education funding between the 
US and the euro area could be addressed by enhancing conditions for private funding.  
4 The role of regulatory policy: labour and product markets
4.1 Factor input: labour 
This section turns to the factor market regulation and conducts an assessment of the 
functioning of labour markets with regard to employment, output and market adjustment. 
High levels of labour utilisation are a sign of good performance, while labour flexibili-
ty7 indicators reflect the quality of the regulatory policy input8. Improvements in the la-
bour market performance are seen as an important prerequisite for the euro area countri-
es to prepare for the negative consequences of demographic changes and globalisation, 
besides their importance for the absorption of asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. 
As the size of the working age population decreases (due to ageing) and the competition 
sharpens (due to globalisation), it is important that labour market participation and em-
ployment rates continue to increase. In addition, ongoing restructuring and transformati-
on require that euro area labour markets match job searchers and vacancies efficiently in 
order to retain and reabsorb workers from declining industries.
Both the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries (particularly the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden) and Japan have already achieved relatively high total 
employment rates (see Figure 6), high labour market participation rates (total, for women, 
for the young and old) and low aggregate unemployment, including youth unemployment. 
Two of the continental reformers, the Netherlands and Austria, have also shown relative-
ly good employment performances. However, the Nordics seem to incur some detrimen-
tal effects of their social model on private employment, which they partially offset thro-
6 Moreover, reforms of public expenditure and structural features of the economy may be more helpful to the 
poor and low-income earners than what vested interests in the existing systems would make believe. Even the rela-
tively poorest income quintile in countries that reform their economies and public spending can fare comparative-
ly better than the corresponding income group in countries with no or only timid reforms (see Schuknecht and Tanzi 
(2005, Table 8, 33). In other words, it is trivial but true that relatively poor people in rich countries can be better off 
in absolute terms than vice versa.
7 Labour market flexibility can be defined as the labour market’s ability to adapt and respond to changing eco-
nomic conditions, either through changes in quantities (employment or hours worked) or prices (wages).
8 Note that labour market flexibility may be made up of both desirable and less desirable flexibility components. 
For example, forms of labour market flexibility which increase individuals’ opportunities to work through more flex-
ible working hours, part-time arrangements and through removing barriers to labour market entry (such as high tax 
wedges) are arguably desirable. Other forms of flexibility, such as an increase in temporary low quality jobs, or wast-
ed spending on badly designed active labour market policies, would not be desirable.271
M. Heipertz and M. Ward-Warmedinger: Economic and Social Models in Europe
and the Importance of Reform
Financial Theory and Practice 32 (3) 255-287 (2008)
Figure 6 Employment policy outputs
Note: The 45 degree line represents a ‘no-change’ scenario over the time period considered. 
Countries above the line have increased their scores, whereas countries below have decreased them.
Source: OECD (2006) Employment Outlook, OECD social indicators (2005).
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ugh relatively high expenditure on active labour market policies (ALMPs, which include 
e.g. job placement services and training) and, in particular, very high rates of public sec-
tor employment (see Figure 7). Subtracting the rate of public employment from the total 
figures in fact reduces the Danish and Swedish employment performance from outstan-
ding (1st and 3rd position) to average (10th and 11th, see Figure A in Appendix 1). 
Figure 7 Expenditure on labour market policies and public employment
Public expenditure on active labour market measures as a percentage of GDP 2004
Proportion of public employees in total population % 2004
Note: Active measures include e.g. training and job seekers support. 
Source: OECD (2004; 2005a; 2006); AMECO and OECD. No data available on ALMP expendi-
ture for Spain.273
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In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon countries, whilst also applying the principles of some 
activation policies (e.g. making unemployment compensation conditional on job search 
and training), have tended to achieve good labour market outcomes through increased 
market efficiency with generally low expenditure on ALMPs and considerably more mo-
derate public employment. 
Continental and Mediterranean European countries generally show relatively unfavo-
urable employment performance, with low to moderate expenditure on ALMPs and des-
pite sometimes relatively high public employment (especially in the case of France). 
Figure 8 shows that many countries have made some progress in increasing the flexi-
bility of their labour markets (and hence reducing their regulatory policy inputs) over the 
last decade. For example, the levels of employment protection legislation and tax wedges 
have fallen in a number of cases between the first half of the 1990s and the early 2000s 
(shown by the clustering of countries on the right-hand side of the 45 degree line in Fi-
gure 8).
The percentage of trade union density provides a proxy measure for a number of la-
bour market regulations such as health and safety regulations and regulations on wor-
king hours, and has been found to be related to the degree of real wage rigidity.9 Figure 
8 shows that trade union density also decreased in most countries over this period, altho-
ugh the union coverage remained at 68% or over for all the EU-15 Member States, with 
the exception of Luxembourg and the UK (at 60% and 30% respectively), and even in-
creased (by about 10%) in the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Denmark over 
the last decade. 
The Anglo-Saxon countries typically exhibit relatively flexible labour markets and 
the lowest degree of employment protection legislation (both on temporary and regular 
contracts), low tax wedges (in line with their relatively small governments), low repla-
cement rates and average to low trade union densities (and coverage for the UK). Nordic 
countries, on the other hand, favour high degrees of social protection, relatively high re-
placement rates and tax wedges (in line with their relatively large governments) as well 
as high trade union density and coverage, but exhibit moderate levels of Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL). Most Mediterranean European countries are characterised 
by relatively strict EPL, but otherwise group together around or above the median on the 
other input indicators, along with the continental countries. Certain countries stand out as 
having significantly more rigid labour market institutions, such as Belgium and France, 
with relatively high rigidity scores on all four of the measures presented. 
Linking rigidity to performance of labour markets highlights some important influen-
ces of their regulatory design on economic outcomes. Firstly, strict EPL on regular con-
tracts is found to significantly worsen the job prospects of new labour market entrants par-
ticularly the young, by reducing job turnover and hiring (see Bertola et al. (2002), Jimeno 
and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002), OECD (2004), and the first panel in Figure 10, although 
the correlation here is not strong). Secondly, the lower job turnover supported by strict EPL 
increases both the duration of unemployment and the proportion of the long-term unem-
ployed (see OECD (2006) and the second panel in Figure 9). These two indicators show 
9 See Dickens et al. (2006).274
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Figure 8 Labour market institutions
Strictness of EPL: aggregate measure (value 0 to 6 = low to high EPL)
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that the earlier pattern of overall employment rates repeated, with Anglo-Saxon, Nordic 
and some of the reform-minded continental European countries performing best. 
Thirdly, recent work by OECD (2006) argues that the negative interaction between 
EPL on regular contracts and employment also reduces the responsiveness of employment 275
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Note: The 45 degree line represents a ‘no change’ scenario over the time period considered. 
Countries above the line have increased their scores, whereas countries below have decreased them.
France has a very low rate of union density, below 10%; however, union coverage (that is, the pro-
portion of workers covered by union agreements, whether or not they are union members) was estima-
ted at 90% in 2000. Replacement rates measure the generosity of unemployment benefits through con-
sidering the average of benefit levels relative to income from obtaining employment.
Source: OECD (1994; 2004; 2005).
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Figure 9 Interaction of EPL and labour market outcomes
Strictness of EPL (aggregate measure: value 0 to 6 – low to high EPL)  and the rate of 
youth unemployment (15 to 24 year olds)
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Note: The equation shows the fit and significance (p-value) of the regression line.
Source: OECD (1994; 2004; 2005).
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P-value (0,10) R2 = 0.1855
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and wages to adverse shocks. The analysis connects the reform of EPL on temporary con-
tracts in a number of countries over recent years to the significant increase in the share 277
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of temporary jobs in total employment (e.g. in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain). This could suggest that, while reducing overall EPL may actually 
boost employment, the burden of employment-related adjustment costs now falls clearly 
on temporary rather than permanent contract workers. 
As a consequence of the possible negative effects of EPL on employment and labo-
ur market adjustment, the policy debate has recently paid close attention to the Danish 
“flexicurity” model. This system is said to “protect the worker, not the job”, being cha-
racterised by relatively low levels of EPL in conjunction with generous unemployment 
benefits (and corresponding high taxes and ALMP measures). In addition, job turnover 
is relatively efficient in Denmark, possibly as a result of relatively long notification peri-
ods which allow displaced workers to search for their next job in good time. As a result, 
the rate of long term unemployment is low. However, it must be said that EPL levels are 
still higher in Denmark than in the Anglo Saxon countries (see Figure 8) and long term 
unemployment rates are still higher than in the US (Figure 9).10 
In addition, systems based on high taxes and generous social support suffer from high 
tax wedges, which are seen to have a negative effect on labour market outcomes by re-
ducing the supply and demand of labour resources. Moreover, high net replacement rates 
prolong unemployment spells and associated welfare losses.11 Figure 11 shows the nega-
tive and significant relationship between an increase in direct tax rates and employment 
on the one hand (left-hand panel), and between the level of marginal tax rate and hours 
of work on the other (right-hand panel). Anglo-Saxon countries experience higher em-
ployment outcomes (in terms of people employed, both in changes and levels, and hours 
worked), which can be associated with their relatively low average taxes. Mediterrane-
an countries (such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal) combine moderately higher average 
taxes with above-average hours of work, but below-average employment rates. The Nor-
dics and even more so some continental European countries (particularly Belgium, Fran-
ce and Luxembourg) generally tend to have higher marginal tax rates on labour and less 
favourable employment performance than Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan.
One can further identify important interactions between the choice and design of par-
ticular components of benefit systems and labour market performance. For example, the 
unemployment compensation systems that offer generous benefits of long or infinite du-
ration have been found to distort labour supply by reducing job search intensity and by 
lowering the opportunity cost of not working.12 The interaction of benefits and taxes on 
labour can create unemployment or inactivity traps, especially for low-paid or low-ski-
lled workers on the margins of the labour market.13 Badly designed eligibility criteria for 
disability programmes along with the provision of early retirement schemes have been 
found to offer routes to early labour market exit,14 reducing the employment of older wor-
10 See also an IMF study (Annett, 2006) for a critical assessment of the Danish model.
11 See, for example, OECD (2006), Bassanini and Duval (2006), Kongsrud and Wanner (2005), Jimeno Rodrigu-
ez-Palenzuela (2002), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Elmeskov et al. (1998).
12 Supported by the work of Bassanini and Duval (2006), Nickell et al. (2005), Nunziata (2003), Jimeno and 
Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002) and Elmeskov et al. (1998).
13 See OECD (2006b).
14 See, for example, Leiner-Killinger et al. (2005).278
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Figure 11 Interaction of taxes and labour market outcomes
Change in direct taxes versus the change in the employment rate, 1969s to 1990s 
The marginal tax rate versus the average annual hours of work per worker
Note: The equation shows the fit and significance (p-value) of the regression line.
Source: OECD (1994, 2004, 2005).
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kers. Badly designed legislation to limit worker abuse may have negative effects on ave-
rage annual hours of work.15
15 See, for example, Haveman et al. (1991).279
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Benefit systems also interact with economy-wide economic outcomes and adjustment 
mechanisms. Recent work by the OECD (2006) argues that social safety nets relying on 
passive income transfers are less effective in dealing with permanent supply shocks (e.g. 
technological change) as opposed to temporary demand shocks (e.g. stemming from in-
vestment and stock cycles). Generous benefit systems therefore reduce hardship in down-
turns, but, if poorly designed, may also delay labour market adjustment and therefore lead 
to a greater persistence of low activity resulting from shocks. This suggests a trade-off 
between the positive effects of benefit systems in cushioning the initial negative impact 
of adjustment and reducing the capacity of labour markets to rebound. The OECD (2006) 
finds that over the period 1995 to 2005, the persistence of economic slack tended to be 
stronger in countries where social safety nets are more extensive. This finding is suppor-
ted by a number of econometric studies which confirm that social safety nets are costly in 
that they increase the persistence of high unemployment and lower activity after an econo-
my has been hit by a negative shock.16 A number of studies have also found evidence that 
countries with low estimates of output gap persistence (in other words, countries where 
any differences between actual and potential output – representing production efficienci-
es - are generally short lived) predominantly include the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic coun-
tries.17 In contrast, output gaps are found to be highly persistent in the large continental 
European countries as well as Japan. This suggests that for countries to reap the rewards 
from benefit systems in terms of reducing personal hardship, but also to avoid negative 
consequences of such systems for adjustment, systems need to tread a fine line. This is 
not an easy task – see, for example, Dixit (2007) who surveys the institutional economics 
literature, outlining the difficulty in identifying the components of successful institutio-
nal design. Nevertheless, a number of general guiding principles are outlined in Europe-
an policy fora, such as those within the Lisbon agenda for jobs and growth.  
4.2 Factor input: other markets
Flexibility in other areas of regulatory policy, such as the design of product  markets, 
may not only improve economic performance in general but may provide important adjus-
tment channels in the absence of flexible labour markets, particularly for countries that 
face political resistance to a comprehensive reform of social security systems. For exam-
ple, some work by the OECD (2002) concludes that product market regulations can have 
important effects on labour market performance. Figure 12 therefore presents the extent 
of product market regulation in our 17 countries. It shows that almost all countries have 
experienced some degree of deregulation of their product markets over the last decade. 
Furthermore, particularly the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic blocks have benefited from rela-
tively low levels of product market regulation over the last decade. This may have helped 
the Nordics to sustain their relatively large public sectors. As concerns Mediterranean and 
16 Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) find that higher replacement rates, stricter EPL and a higher tax wedge lead to 
significantly persistent high unemployment following an adverse shock. Scarpetta (1996) finds a significant and pos-
itive effect of employment benefit rates and EPL on persistence. These results are confirmed in the recent work of 
Bassanini and Duval (2006) and Duval (2006).
17 See OECD (2006) and Cotis and Coppel (2005).280
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Figure 11 Product market regulation and labour market outcomes
Product market regulation: Aggregate measure (value 0 to 6 – low to high regulation)
Note: The 45 degree line represents a ‘no change’ scenario over the time period considered - coun-
tries below the line have become less regulated. The equation shows the fit and significance (p-value) 
of the regression line.
Source: OECD (2006).
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Continental European countries, this group generally exhibits relatively rigid product mar-
kets, with the exception of a few reform-minded countries, notably the Netherlands.
The right-hand panel of Figure 11 demonstrates an example of possible cross-market 
effects, highlighting the negative correlation between the degree of product market regu-
lation and labour productivity growth. Therefore countries with relatively low levels of 
product market regulation, such as Ireland, the US, UK, Sweden and Finland, also tend 
to experience relatively high levels of productivity growth. Work by the OECD, among 
others, has also emphasised the significant effect of stronger product market competiti-
on on employment. Here the product market regulatory environment has been found to 
account for up to 3 percentage points of deviations of the non-agricultural employment 
rate from the OECD average. 
5 Synthesis and Conclusion
In this study, we have examined indicators of fiscal and regulatory policies and their 
correlation with a number of country performance indicators in domains relevant for 
the “economic and social model” debate, namely: the functioning of markets, economic 
growth, employment, education, income distribution and fiscal sustainability in 17 indu-
strialised countries. Some interesting patterns emerge and partly confirm the findings from 
earlier studies in this debate (e.g. Sapir, 2005) but also reveal some interesting “news” as 
to the most appropriate grouping and characterisation of countries. 
Anglo-Saxon countries combine relatively low and efficient public expenditure with 
flexible markets and strong economic and labour market performance. These countries 
typically ground their positive labour market outcomes on flexibility, with generally low 
levels of employment protection legislation, union membership and coverage, tax wed-
ges and replacement rates, low expenditure on active labour market policies and modera-
te public employment. However, the Anglo-Saxon economic and social model produces 
larger income inequality associated with a lower degree of social protection. 
Most Nordic countries have equally favourable employment outcomes – particularly 
in terms of the number (rather than hours) of people employed. However, they have ten-
ded to support this performance with relatively high expenditure on active labour mar-
ket policies as well as with a degree of public sector employment that is extensive by any 
standard. Furthermore, the labour market components of their social model, with relati-
vely high levels of EPL, union density, tax wedges and replacement rates, appear both re-
latively inflexible and costly – in terms of financing, in terms of foregone private sector 
employment and possibly also in terms of adjustment capacity to shocks (such as struc-
tural shocks resulting from globalisation). Their social and economic model, based on 
comprehensive safety nets and income equality, is made operational by high product mar-
ket flexibility and relatively well-developed capital markets. The sustainability of their 
high levels of public spending in terms of tax revenue is questionable, especially when 
considering the challenges that may be posed by globalisation and increased internatio-
nal competition.282
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In contrast to both the Nordic and the Anglo-Saxon cases, most Mediterranean and 
continental countries in Europe exhibit mixed approaches with regard to both the choice 
and design of their market and social policy components. Lack of progress with structu-
ral reforms seems to have adverse effects on the labour market performance, economic 
growth and education standards, while at the same time burdening some of these countri-
es with large and inefficient public sectors, which may in turn lead to sustainability con-
cerns. Concurrently, product markets remain relatively rigid. A number of continental 
European countries experience low income inequality, but also relatively low levels of 
labour utilisation – both in terms of the number of people employed and hours worked. 
Many Mediterranean countries combine unfavourable employment performance and li-
mited income equality. 
Finally, a number of reform-minded continental European countries (most notably 
the Netherlands and Spain, but also Austria and Belgium) have significantly improved 
the performance and efficiency of their public sectors in the fiscal and regulatory sphe-
re over the past two decades. This seems to have contributed to the better functioning of 
markets and improved growth and employment developments, at a little cost to social po-
licy objectives.
From a more horizontal and policy-oriented perspective, this study suggests that pu-
blic sectors may be much smaller in many European countries without necessarily impl-
ying very unequal income distribution, while boosting growth and fiscal sustainability. 
Better designed social safety nets may enhance the efficient allocation of resources and 
facilitate an economy’s adjustment to economic shocks without seriously undermining 
equalisation of incomes and social protection. Good regulatory policies in factor and pro-
duct markets help economic efficiency and labour market performance, thereby also hel-
ping finance more generous social systems without putting fiscal sustainability at risk. 
Furthermore, fiscal reforms accompanied by comprehensive structural reforms have pro-
ved to result in significant improvements in the fiscal and economic performance witho-
ut much cost in terms of social equality.18 
This supports calls for a careful approach to the reform of fiscal policies and labour 
and product markets to support the growth potential of the euro area. The cross-effects of 
the structural reform are significant, and success in one policy domain may either facili-
tate or inhibit the reform in others. While there is often no single correct strategy for all 
countries, countries can learn from each other to develop better labour market institutions 
and policies which will help to achieve the desired results. Guiding principles are set out 
within the framework of the Lisbon Agenda, for example, and individual countries have 
agreed on the need for reform. However, complexity of the reform process and political 
will often erect a barrier to reform progress. Predictions about the sustainability of “eco-
nomic and social models” in the future are, of course, difficult to make. Not only demo-
graphic movements but also intensifying global competition for talents and capital are li-
kely to put pressure on public expenditure, in particular on high social spending coupled 
with high tax rates and labour market inflexibility.
18 Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) and Hauptmeier et al. (2006).283
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Source: Sapír (2005:8).
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The current discussion on social and economic models at times suffers from confusi-
on about the meaning of government performance versus efficiency. For example, Sapír 
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(2005) finds that Nordic countries report high employment rates, interpreting this as an 
indication of efficiency. However, the employment rate is an output indicator that pro-
vides one measure of economic performance. It is not possible to say anything about the 
efficiency without looking at this performance relative to the inputs used (for example, 
the amount of public spending on government employees as well as active labour market 
policies and the degree of labour market protection). 
Secondly, the findings on the performance of governments frequently depend on the 
choice of indicator. If, for example, total employment as performance indicator is repla-
ced by private employment (i.e. an alternative output measure) the above-mentioned pic-
ture by Sapir looks very different, especially for the Nordic countries (see Figure 13). The 
right-hand panel shows that this alternative choice of indicator yields an alternative co-
untry grouping, reflecting the fact that the apparent labour market success of the Nordic 
countries is to a large part due to inflated public sector employment. Some of the reform-
minded continental European countries (here Austria and the Netherlands) look compa-
ratively more successful in the fight against poverty and unemployment than those coun-
tries that have to foot an enormous public wage bill in order to attain their overall satis-
factory employment performance.285
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